Anat R. Admati is the George G.C. Parker Professor of Finance and Economics at Stanford University Graduate School of Business (GSB), a Director of the GSB Corporations and Society Initiative, and a senior fellow at Stanford °ËØÔ±¬ÁÏ for Economic Policy Research. She has written extensively on information dissemination in financial markets, portfolio management, financial contracting, corporate governance and banking. Admati’s current research, teaching and advocacy focus on the complex interactions between business, law, and policy with focus on governance and accountability.
Since 2010, Admati has been active in the policy debate on financial regulations. She is the co-author, with Martin Hellwig, of the award-winning and highly acclaimed book (Princeton University Press, 2013; ). In 2014, she was named by Time Magazine as one of the and by Foreign Policy Magazine as among .
Admati holds BSc from the Hebrew University, MA, MPhil and PhD from Yale University, and an honorary doctorate from University of Zurich. She is a fellow of the Econometric Society, the recipient of multiple fellowships, research grants, and paper recognition, and is a past board member of the American Finance Association. She has served on a number of editorial boards and is a member of the FDIC’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, a former member of the CFTC’s Market Risk Advisory Committee, and a former visiting scholar at the International Monetary Fund.
Anat Admati
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Making Financial Regulations Work for Society
Remarks from Finance & Society May 6, 2015
The Persistence of a Reckless Banking System
The fall of 2008 was scary. For most people, the aftermath of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy resembled a major earthquake with strong aftershocks. Official narratives have promoted the image of the crisis as a rare, unpreventable and unforeseen natural disaster, the “100-year flood.” Policymakers emphasize the extraordinary measures they have taken to prevent the system from collapsing and to support recovery since.
If Not Now, When? Financial Reform Must Not Await Another Crisis
In the first ten chapters of our book, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It, we discuss banking and the economics of funding as it applies to banks.
Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation
We analyze shareholders’ incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer.
Featuring this expert
Financial Regulation Shouldn’t Be Hard—Here’s What We Need to Make It Work
We can land planes safely at crowded airports, yet we can’t manage to make our financial system safe. Why?
Our Banking System is a Giant House of Cards
It Could Fall On You.
The Failure of Financial Regulation
Anat Admati, author of The Bankers’ New Clothes: Whats Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It, talks about how to fix our broken banking sector.